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This study draws on concepts from political and risk communication to inform 
our understanding of what motivates people to be politically active. Inspired by concerns 
that traditional models of participation do not perform as well among younger and more 
diverse populations (e.g. Bennett, 2008), alternate variables are considered including risk 
perceptions surrounding policy issues and political parties. Results show that established 
political variables such as political interest and civic duty remain strongly associated with 
participation, while offering support for several new variables of interest from the risk 
communication literature. In the present study, threat and efficacy perceptions explained 
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Introduction and Literature Review 
Risks are an inevitable part of life. While some risks exist at the level of the 
individual, many of the risks we experience exist at a societal level. From traffic 
accidents to earthquakes to climate change, addressing these shared risks is achieved, in 
part, through political action (Koski, 2010; May, 1991; Moser & Dilling, 2011). Two 
branches of the field of communication focus on understanding perceptions of these 
shared risks: risk communication and political communication. Broadly speaking, risk 
communication scholars study how people perceive risks, and how best to design and 
disseminate messages that promote risk awareness and inspire people to take action 
(Lundgreen & McKaien, 2013; Moser & Dilling, 2011; Ruhrmann, 2008). Political 
communication scholars study how public perception of issues translates into public 
opinion, support for public policy, and political engagement (Bennett & Iyengar, 2008; 
Ryfe, 2001). While risk and political communication typically focus on distinct 
communication phenomena, integrations of concepts from these two fields—though 
rare—indicate a potential for advances in our understanding of political participation (e.g. 
Glasford, 2008; Hart & Feldman, 2016; O’Connor, Bard, & Fisher, 1999).  
 One of the ways in which publics can address risk, both at the individual and 
societal levels, is through political participation (O’Connor, Bard, & Fisher, 1999). This 
includes voting and other means of influencing the selection and decision-making of 
government officials. As an example, scientists, scholars, and advocates agree that any 
plan to address climate change must have a policy component (e.g. Hart & Feldman, 
2016; Moser & Dilling, 2011; O’Connor, Bard, & Fisher, 1999). Through political 
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participation, citizens can influence which shared risks are addressed by government and 
how. Trends in electoral participation can offer some insight into who engages in political 
participation and, thus, shapes the way shared risks are addressed. After decades of 
steady decline, electoral participation in the United States increased considerably in the 
2018 midterm and 2020 presidential elections (Campbell, 2006; Norris, 2015; Persily & 
Stewart III, 2021). Whereas there has been long-standing concern about the engagement 
of younger citizens in politics, turnout in 2018 and 2020 increased most sharply among 
young voters (Cilluffo & Fry, 2019; Fabina, 2021). This abrupt reversal raises the need to 
review known predictors of participation and consider new variables that can shed light 
on who participates in politics and why. 
Current models in political communication have identified some reliable 
antecedents of voter participation, including demographics (Leighley & Nagler, 2013; 
Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980), political interest (Blais, 2000; Prior, 2010), political 
efficacy (Abramson & Aldrich, 1982; Campbell, 2006; Craig, 1979; Shore, 2020), and 
civic duty (Blais & Daost, 2020; Cambell, 2006; Delli Carpini, 2000; Riker & 
Oldeshook, 1968). Similarly, current models in risk communication identify antecedents 
to individual and collective risk mitigation behaviors, including risk perceptions (Witte, 
1992), and self-efficacy (Bandura, 1986; Witte, 1992).     
While typically siloed, I offer that combining insights derived from both risk and 
political communication may lead to a more holistic understanding of the variables 
associated with risk-related political behavior. I measured variables from both fields that 
are known predictors of behavioral intention and investigated the relative importance of 
each in predicting political participation. In what follows, I describe the variables known 
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to affect political participation and adoption of preventative risk behaviors. I then discuss 
how policy issues and political parties have been framed as risks to the general public. I 
propose that individuals’ risk and efficacy perceptions offer additional insight into who 
participates and why. 
Political Communication 
Who Participates in Politics 
 Understanding who doesn’t participate in politics begins with looking at who 
does. In the present study, political participation refers to actions taken to influence the 
selection or decisions of government actors. A prominent example of political 
participation is voting. While the electorate has been steadily growing younger and more 
diverse (Barroso, 2020), those who participate in politics remain disproportionately 
white, wealthy, educated, and (relatively) old (Leighley & Nagler, 2013; Wolfinger & 
Rosenstone, 1980). Though these demographic factors—particularly age, income, and 
education—are among the strongest predictors of electoral participation (Brady, Verba, & 
Schlozman, 1995; Leighley & Nagler, 2013; Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980), there are 
several other individual-level variables that are consistently included in turnout models, 
including political interest, political efficacy, and civic duty. While some evidence 
suggests that the resources and advantages that precede electoral participation also 
influence who engages in other forms of participation (Best & Krueger, 2005), there is 
some indication that alternate forms of political participation—particularly online—
attract younger and more diverse citizens (Bennett, 2008; Bennett, Wells, & Rank, 2009; 
Best & Krueger, 2005; Omotayo & Folorunso, 2020). 
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 Political Interest. As a variable related to political behavior, interest is fairly 
intuitive: people who are interested in politics participate in politics. Though the causal 
pathway is somewhat unclear, political interest is commonly used to explain variance in 
participation (Blais & Daoust, 2020; Brady, Verba, & Schlozman, 1995; Prior, 2010). 
Literature suggests that political interest is a fairly stable, trait-like variable that develops 
early in life. Though it can fluctuate in response to personal and situational factors, it 
quickly rebounds to its long-term level (Prior, 2010).   
 Civic Duty. Blais (2000) describes civic duty as “an ethical judgement that voting 
is right and not voting is wrong” (p. 93). He distinguishes civic duty from political 
interest, claiming that the former is moral and represents a sense of what one ought to do 
(Blais & Daoust, 2020). Citizens with a strong sense of civic duty often gain satisfaction 
from electoral participation, regardless of the outcome. For this reason, Riker and 
Oldeshook (1968) added it to their calculus of voting—a participation model that builds 
on Downs’ (1957) rational choice model. Here, it offers an explanation for a problem that 
continues to plague rational choice scholars: why do people participate in elections when 
they know their vote is statistically inconsequential? Because civic duty is considered to 
be an important antecedent to political and civic participation, fostering civic duty 
through socialization and education is often recommended by scholars. Nevertheless, 
there is a decreasing trend in civic duty, especially in recent generations.  
Political Efficacy. Political efficacy refers to the subjective attitudes that inform 
political behavior. The definition commonly used by scholars is “the feeling that 
individual political action does have, or can have, an impact upon the political process… 
It is the feeling that political and social change is possible, and that the individual citizen 
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can play a part in bringing about this change” (Campbell, Gurin, & Miller, 1954, p. 187). 
Political efficacy comprises two dimensions: internal and external.  
Internal Efficacy. Internal efficacy captures an individual’s evaluation of their 
ability to participate in politics. This includes both a perception that the opportunity for 
participation is accessible and a feeling of personal competence (Niemi, Craig, & Mattei, 
1991). Internal efficacy is assumed to be a direct precursor to participation (Shore, 2020), 
but also acts as a mediator. Research shows that internal efficacy mediates the 
relationship between socio-economic factors and participation, as people who are more 
educated and well-connected feel more confident in their ability to participate in politics 
(Shore, 2020). This cuts the other way, as Marx and Nguyen (2016) find that the 
depressive effects of poverty on participation are mediated by low internal efficacy. 
Internal efficacy also helps explain the relationship between political knowledge and 
participation. The mediating role of internal efficacy might be articulated as the 
subjective evaluation of one’s political knowledge, or the feeling that one knows enough 
to participate meaningfully in politics (Reichert, 2016). 
External Efficacy. External efficacy measures perceptions of the responsiveness 
of government to citizen influence attempts (Craig, 1979). That is, the extent to which 
people believe that participation is a viable way to influence government officials. As 
with internal efficacy, external efficacy has a direct relationship to participation (Rumbul, 
2016) and also mediates the relationship between participation and individual-level 
factors like wealth (Marx & Nguyen, 2018), education (Jackson, 1995), and social 
capital. Abramson and Aldrich (1982) estimate that at least half of the decline in voter 
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turnout between 1960 and 1980 can be attributed to a decline in external political 
efficacy.  
Consistent with this prior research, I offer the following hypothesis: 
H1: Political interest, civic duty, internal efficacy, and external efficacy predicts 
political participation. 
Why People Participate in Politics 
In addition to understanding who participates, it is worthwhile to consider why 
people participate. Campbell (2006) describes a continuum anchored by two perspectives 
on civic and political involvement, dating back to the earliest conceptualizations of 
democracy in the United States: one is that citizens are motivated to participate out of a 
sense of duty, and the other is that they participate in order to advance their own interests. 
Campbell (2006, p. 193) notes that interest-driven citizens “ask themselves: Do I need to 
vote in this election to defend my interests?” A similar typology is offered by Bennett 
(2008; Bennett, Wells, & Rank, 2009) who describes a shift in recent decades away from 
a dutiful citizen paradigm, in which one votes out of a sense of civic duty, toward an 
actualizing citizen paradigm characterized by involvement driven by interest in 
“personally meaningful, lifestyle-related political issues” (Bennett, 2008, p. 20). Though 
this is perhaps most visible among recent generations, not all actualizing citizens are 
young. According to Bennett, the shift is, in part, a product of cultural changes that have 
replaced group-based society with a network-based society—a change that has the 
potential to affect people across generations.  
A potential shortcoming, then, of communication efforts aimed at increasing 
participation is an assumption that civic duty is still a primary motivator. This is not to 
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say that fostering civic duty is not a worthwhile endeavor. Certainly, research shows that 
a sense of civic duty is a powerful motivator for participation—not only in elections but 
in other vital expressions of community and political involvement (Campbell, 2006). 
However, there is a growing need to consider models that better account for actualizing 
citizens. Bennett notes that actualizing citizens are characterized by a lack of trust in 
traditional forms of participation (i.e. voting), an observation echoed in Delli Carpini’s 
(2000) examination of civic disengagement. While these citizens may prefer alternate 
forms of participation or forgo participation altogether, voting remains critical to the 
legitimacy and health of our democracy (Campbell, 2006). In order to increase the 
participation of actualizing citizens, we need to better understand their interests and 
motivations.   
 Despite decades of research and numerous models that focus on or combine 
individual, political, and contextual variables, there are persistent unexplained gaps in 
what we know about political participation (Matsusaka & Palda, 1999). Studies 
repeatedly highlight the need for future research to uncover more factors that affect 
involvement, particularly among younger citizens (e.g. Glasford, 2008; Matsusaka & 
Palda, 1999).   
Risk Communication 
Risk communication theory could provide additional insights by offering a new 
way to think about political participation. For citizens who are keen to advance or protect 
their interests, participation might be a means to that end. If failing to protect their 
interests is recontextualized as a risk, then participation could be characterized as a 
preventative risk behavior. The risk communication field is replete with strategies for 
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understanding and promoting such behaviors (e.g. Azjen, 1991; Bandura, 1986; Bandura 
2004; Witte, 1992). One concern central to risk communication is how individuals 
process and react to fear appeal-based messaging (Leventhal, 1970; Rogers, 1975; Witte, 
1992), as fear appeals are a common tactic used by risk communicators (Popova, 2012). 
Appeals to fear are also a common tactic used in political communication, as partisan 
actors attempt to associate the opposition with feared outcomes, or to change attitudes by 
prompting viewers to critically process new information (Brader, 2006; Cryderman & 
Arceneaux, 2010; Scheller, 2019). Given the potential to re-frame political involvement 
as a risk mitigation behavior and the prevalence of fear appeals in both risk and political 
communication, risk communication may offer additional insights that more holistically 
explain participatory behavior.    
The Extended Parallel Process Model 
One fear appeal theory with components that align with political participation 
variables is the extended parallel process model (EPPM; Witte, 1992). The EPPM grew 
out of previous work attempting to explain the inconsistent success of fear appeals in 
health communication. The earlier parallel process model (Leventhal, 1970) identified 
two general responses to fear appeals: danger control—a primarily cognitive process—
and fear control—a primarily emotional process. As emphasis in the field shifted to 
cognitive behavioral approaches, subsequent work on fear appeals focused on danger 
control—particularly the elements and approaches that motivated cognitive appraisal of 
fear inducing behavioral-change messages. Out of this work emerged the Protection 
Motivation Theory (PMT; Rogers, 1975), which identified message characteristics that 
led to adaptive or maladaptive responses to fear appeals. Incorporating Bandura’s (1986) 
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notion of self-efficacy, Rogers proposed that only messages which successfully instilled a 
confidence in the individual’s ability to perform the recommended action would lead to 
message acceptance and adoption of the adaptive behavior. Despite decades of 
subsequent research, however, these theories and models failed to produce consistent 
empirical results. They could not reliably represent the role and interaction of the 
variables, and overwhelmingly focused on danger control to the exclusion of fear control. 
To address these deficiencies and inconsistencies, Witte (1992) developed the extended 
parallel process model, claiming that threat perceptions and efficacy perceptions interact 
to produce message acceptance and behavioral change.  
Threat. Threat comprises two variables: severity and susceptibility. In order for 
the fear appeal to have any effect, the individual must perceive that a threat exists—one 
that is significant and relevant. Importantly, there is a distinction between message 
characteristics that express these components and the perception of them by individual 
message recipients. How a person evaluates the threat is determined by how severe they 
perceive the threat to be and how personally susceptible they think they are.   
Severity. In EPPM, severity of the threat is the magnitude of detrimental 
consequences associated with the risk—the potential result of taking no action. As 
applied in EPPM, severity refers to message characteristics designed to convey this 
magnitude, while perceived severity is the attitude held by the intended audience. In a 
health-related example, campaigns aimed at the risk of smoking might emphasize the 
severity of outcomes such as lung cancer. In a public policy example, campaigns about 
climate change have emphasized the severity of extreme weather events (Li, 2014).  
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Susceptibility. Susceptibility is the personal relevance of the threat, or the 
perceived likelihood that these consequences will be experienced by the individual 
message recipient. For example, someone who smokes cigarettes infrequently may 
perceive that their health risk is lower than a heavy smoker (low perceived susceptibility), 
and so messages targeted at this user may emphasize their susceptibility. In a study about 
perceptions of climate change, Li (2014) manipulated perceived susceptibility by using 
news stories about either weather events in the country or in a remote part of the world.  
Efficacy. With its origins in Bandura’s (1986) Social Cognitive Theory, efficacy 
in risk communication refers to agentic cognitive appraisals. Witte’s (1992) original 
model identified two efficacy dimensions: self-efficacy and response efficacy. Self-
efficacy is a belief about personal agency—that is, the extent to which the individual 
views themself as capable of producing desired effects and preventing undesired ones 
(Bandura, 2000). Response efficacy is the confidence that the recommended behavior or 
solution will adequately address the threat. Both dimensions have been shown to affect 
attitudes and behaviors for risks such as pandemics (Barnett et al., 2009), sexually 
transmitted diseases (Hong, 2011); and climate change (Feldman & Hart, 2014; Hart & 
Feldman, 2016). Previous research found that combining response efficacy information 
with internal and external political efficacy information in messages about climate 
change increased intended political participation through increased hope (Feldman & 
Hart, 2016).   
Policy Issues 
Consistent with the findings of risk communication practitioners, observations 
about the individualized politics of actualizing citizens raises the possibility that 
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motivations to participate should be examined at the issue level (Bennett, 2008). To test 
the utility of this approach, I have selected two policy areas that have been framed in 
terms of risk to individual and social well-being: climate change and social security. 
Climate Change 
Despite widespread agreement among the scientific and academic communities 
that climate change is occurring, largely human-caused, and poses dire risks to the planet 
and humanity (Dryzek, Norgaard, & Schlosberg, 2011), there is a persistent lack of 
consensus among partisans and policymakers in the United States (Hart & Feldman, 
2016; McCright & Dunlap, 2003). While much of the doubt is sowed intentionally by 
special interests (Brulle, 2019; Dunlap & McCright, 2011), there are good reasons for the 
public to experience mixed perceptions and understandings of the risks associated with 
climate change (Jamieson, 2011). Much of the impact of climate change is not visible or 
imminent to many people, particularly in the United States where wealth and 
infrastructure shield us from the consequences of our contribution (Jamieson, 2011; 
Mendelsohn, Dinar, & Williams, 2006). In addition to uncertainty over the causes and 
implications of climate change, its rapid politicization has caused marked disagreements 
over what, if anything, should be done to address it at the policy level (Dunlap & 
McCright, 2011). While liberals and Democrats in government have proposed sweeping 
measures to reduce emissions and invest in sustainable industry (e.g. H.R. 109), 
conservatives and Republicans largely downplay the severity of climate change and 
oppose policies designed to address it (Gerrard, 2016; Moser & Dilling, 2011).  
Climate change is a threat multiplier (Abrahams, 2019), meaning that its 
consequences are likely to add irreparable strain to existing fault lines and weaknesses in 
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a society. Though outcome projections vary widely and depend on myriad factors, 
scientists and researchers acknowledge that the United States is not invulnerable to 
deleterious consequences such as drought, extreme weather events, and sea level rise, 
which could result in food insecurity and significant internal migration (Feng, 
Oppenheimer, & Schlenker, 2012; Smith & Gregory, 2013). The severity of potential 
outcomes is known to scientists and reported by news media, but content analyses have 
found that liberal-leaning outlets are more likely to include this information than 
conservative-leaning outlets. In addition, though both liberal and conservative outlets 
habitually divorce threat and efficacy information in their coverage of climate change, 
conservative outlets are more likely to include negative efficacy information (Feldman, 
Hart, & Milosevic, 2017). Based on predictions of the EPPM, differential perceptions of 
threat and efficacy could have impacts on behavioral reactions. Given that climate change 
is such a controversial policy issue, those reactions will arguably be reflected in political 
participation. Therefore, I propose the following hypothesis: 
H2: Severity, susceptibility, self-efficacy, and response efficacy perceptions for 
climate change predicts variance in political participation. 
Social Security 
 Social Security is a government-run program that supports the economic security 
of elderly citizens. It is funded by working citizens, who pay into the program with the 
expectation that they will one day be able to draw from it themselves. Social security has 
long been a popular program with a diverse base of support and is often cited as a policy 
priority by liberal, moderate, and conservative citizens (Pew Research Center, 2019; 
Sherman, 1989; Yang & Barrett, 2006). In recent years, however, confidence in the 
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solvency of the program has decreased, with an increasing number of people—
particularly young people—doubting they will be able to rely on social security when 
they retire (Parker, Morin, & Horowitz, 2019). These concerns are not unfounded. The 
Social Security Administration (SSA), part of the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability 
Insurance (OASDI) program, has long warned that program costs are due to exceed 
income—an eventuality that has come to pass, as confirmed in their 2019 Annual Report 
(SSA, 2019). For decades, politicians have been discussing reforms to social security. 
Like climate change, the depletion of the funds has not been unanimously regarded as a 
crisis (Yang & Barrett, 2006) and proposals to address the problem vary. While 
Republican politicians have largely favored constriction of the program, Democrats have 
pushed for expansions paid for through taxes on high-income earners (Biden, 2020; Yang 
& Barrett, 2006).  
Despite the importance of the program to a large number of citizens, little 
research has been done on the antecedents of public attitudes toward social security and 
social security reform (Yang & Barrett, 2006). Consistent with results of public opinion 
research (e.g. Pew Research Center, 2019), Yang and Barrett (2006) determine that the 
effect of political ideology on social security attitudes is insignificant. Instead they note 
that self-interest, or social structural position, has a much stronger effect, with citizens 
who are less secure being more likely to favor protection of social security as a policy 
priority. Therefore, I offer the following hypothesis:  
H3: Severity, susceptibility, self-efficacy, and response efficacy perceptions for 
social security predicts political participation. 
Affective Polarization 
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 The political application of fear appeals extends beyond policy issues to frame 
political actors and parties as a risk. There is a growing concern over the widening gap 
between the Democratic and Republican parties in the United States. In addition to 
markedly divergent political perspectives, members of the two parties increasingly report 
a rancorous dislike for and distrust of one another (Dias & Lelkes, 2021; Iyengar, Lelkes, 
Levendusky, Malhotra, & Westwood, 2019; Levendusky, 2013). The growing disparity 
between how partisans feel about the in-party and the out-party is known as affective 
polarization.  
Research on affective polarization suggests that it may be driven by ideological 
polarization (Dias & Lelkes, 2021; Iyengar et al., 2019) and partisan media exposure 
(Iyengar et al., 2019; Levendusky, 2013). While a degree of disagreement over policy 
and cultural issues is an inherent part of our political system, the way these differences 
are communicated by partisan sources drives the negative affective response. Levendusky 
(2013) describes partisan media as opinionated media, helping in-party members make 
sense of political information through a shared ideology. He notes, however, that partisan 
media often achieves this not just through explaining why the in-party is right, but by 
focusing on why the out-party is wrong. This pronounced partisan slant leads viewers to 
like and trust the out-party less and show less support for bipartisanship.  
This effect is mirrored by the rhetoric of politicians, who have increasingly 
emphasized the danger posed by their political opponents (Badger, 2020; Ball, 2016). 
During the 2020 presidential election, for example, President Donald Trump was 
repeatedly portrayed by liberals as “dangerous” (e.g. Cilliza, 2020) while conservatives 
insisted that Democrats constituted the primary threat facing the country (e.g. Costa, 
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Weigel, Sonmez, & Wagner, 2020). Public opinion polling during the campaign found 
that a majority of voters on both sides of the political aisle believe that a victory by the 
other party would result in “lasting harm to the nation” (Deane & Gramlich, 2020, para. 
12). Given this evidence that political parties and actors are perceived as risks, it is 
possible that political participation is driven in part by concerns about the agendas of 
unfavored political parties and candidates. To investigate this, I offer the following 
hypothesis: 
H4: Political polarization and positive and negative perceptions of the Republican 
and Democratic parties predicts variance in political participation. 
To explore whether combining insights from political communication and risk 
communication can increase understanding of the variance in political participation, I 
offer the following research questions: 
RQ1: Does the addition of EPPM variables (severity, susceptibility, self-efficacy, 
response efficacy, and collective efficacy) regarding climate change to political variables 
(political interest, civic duty, internal efficacy, and external efficacy) explain additional 
variance in political participation? 
RQ2: Does the addition of EPPM variables (severity, susceptibility, self-efficacy, 
response efficacy, and collective efficacy) regarding social security to political variables 
(political interest, civic duty, internal efficacy, and external efficacy) explain additional 
variance in political participation? 
RQ3: Does the addition of affective polarization variables (polarization, positive 
and negative perceptions of the Democratic and Republican parties) to political variables 
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(political interest, civic duty, internal efficacy, and external efficacy) offer additional 
predictive power for political participation? 
Methods 
Participants  
Participants (n = 240) were recruited from the College of Liberal Arts and 
Sciences at Portland State University. While most professors were able to offer extra 
credit to their classes in exchange for participation, some were not. IRB approval was 
obtained for both conditions and two identical versions of the survey were offered, 
preceded by different informed consent forms to accommodate the two groups. Of the 
240 responses, 188 received extra credit and 52 did not. Twenty-two responses were 
more than 75% incomplete and so were excluded from analysis. The remaining 
participants (n = 219) were mostly female (n = 122, 55.7%) and white (n = 117, 53.4%), 
with a median age of 24 (M = 27.35, SD = 8.43). A majority of participants were 
Democrats (n= 115, 52.5%) with liberal economic (n = 142, 67.6%) and social views (n 
= 169, 77.2%). See Table 1 for more sample characteristics.  
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Table 1.  
Participant Characteristics 
 
Age   n % 
18 – 24 94 42.9 
25 – 34 59 26.9 
35 – 44 17 7.8 
45 – 54 8 3.7 
55 and older 3 1.4 
Missing 38 17.3 
Annual Household Income n % 
Less than $10,000 22 10.0 
$10,000 – $19,999 32 14.6 
$20,000 – $29,999 34 15.5 
$30,000 – $39,999 18 8.2 
$40,000 – $49,999 15 6.8 
$50,000 – $59,999 21 9.6 
$60,000 – $69,999 11 5.0 
$70,000 – $79,999 5 2.3 
$80,000 – $89,999 7 3.2 
$90,000 – $99,999 9 4.1 
$100,000 or more 39 17.8 
Missing 6 2.7 
Race/Ethnicity n % 
American Indian or Alaska 
Native 
4 1.8 
Asian 26 11.9 
Black or African American 10 4.6 
Hispanic or Latino 28 12.8 
Native Hawaiian or Pacific 
Islander 
1 0.5 
White or Caucasian 121 55.2 
Multiracial or Biracial 15 6.8 
Prefer not to respond 14 6.4 
Gender n % 
Female 122 55.7 
Male 80 36.5 
Prefer not to respond 17 7.8 
   
   
Highest Level of Education n % 
Less than high school 1 0.5 
High school graduate or GED 9 4.1 
Some college 79 36.1 
Associate’s (2-year) degree 87 39.7 
Bachelor’s (4-year) degree 34 15.5 
Graduate degree 9 4.1 
 
Party Affiliation n % 
Democratic 115 52.5 
Republican 12 5.5 
Member of Another Party 24 11.0 
Unaffiliated 65 29.7 
Missing 3 1.4 
Economic Political Ideology n % 
Very Liberal 47 21.5 
Liberal 59 26.9 
Moderately Liberal 42 19.2 
Moderate 42 19.2 
Moderately Conservative 18 8.2 
Conservative 5 2.3 
Very Conservative 2 0.9 
Missing 4 1.8 
Social Political Ideology n % 
Very Liberal 81 37.0 
Liberal 61 27.9 
Moderately Liberal 27 12.3 
Moderate 34 15.5 
Moderately Conservative 5 2.3 
Conservative 6 2.7 
Very Conservative 2 0.9 




 A survey design measured variables of interest from both political communication 
and risk communication theories.  
Recruitment and Data Collection 
All recruitment was conducted remotely and at the discretion of the professors. 
Methods varied by class and included a recorded video appeal from the author, a live 
appeal made in remote classes, and email announcements. All students were directed to a 
survey link shared electronically either by email or on the class page of the school’s 
learning platform, D2L. Data collection began on February 11, 2021, and concluded on 
March 12, 2021.   
Measures  
Dependent variable. The outcome variable was political participation. Risk 
communication scholars identify behavioral intention as the strongest predictor of actual 
behavior (Azjen, 1991; Azjen & Fishbein, 1977; Glasford, 2008). While some political 
scholars caution against the use of intention as a reliable measure for electoral 
participation, direct inquiry into this question using panel data has determined that there 
is a strong correlation between intended and reported participation (Quintelier & Blais, 
2016). Nevertheless, Quintelier and Blais (2016) also note that the intention–behavior 
gap is larger for those with higher levels of political interest, education, and civic duty. 
They caution that reported participation may be a more accurate measure when the goal 
of a study is to estimate the magnitude of the effect of a set of variables on participation. 
With this in mind, I measured both actual and intended participation. Two questions 
measured past participation in (1) presidential and (2) midterm (congressional) elections. 
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To capture forms of participation outside of voting, I adapted the measure of participation 
used in the American National Election Studies (ANES) 2020 Pilot Survey. The original 
measure asks about participatory behavior in the past 12 months; I instead asked about 
likelihood of engaging in these behaviors in the upcoming 12 months. The measure 
included 8 items with a 5-point response scale (extremely unlikely–extremely likely). 
Sample behaviors include “join in a protest march, rally, or demonstration” and “post a 
message or comment online about a political issue or campaign.” These 8 items were 
combined with the two voting items and averaged to form a participation variable (𝛼 = 
.84).  
Political variables 
 Political interest. As recommended by Blais and Daoust (2020) and supported by 
the findings of Prior (2018), political interest was measured with a single, direct question. 
Participants rated their level of interest in national politics on a scale from 1 (“not at all 
interested”) to 5 (“extremely interested”). See Table 2 for political variable means and 
standard deviations. 
 Political efficacy. Two items each measured internal and external political 
efficacy, taken from the ANES. Though measurement of political efficacy has been 
inconsistent in the literature (Chamberlain, 2012; Morrell, 2003), the ANES measure is 
often used by researchers in the United States. This measure has changed over the years, 
which may contribute to the confusion over the optimal way to operationalize the 
concepts. Correlation was used in place of reliability coefficients for these two-item 
scales. As both were significant and moderate, new variables were created from the mean 
of each pair of questions.  
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To measure internal political efficacy, participants were asked, “How often do 
politics and government seem so complicated that you can’t really understand what’s 
going on?” and   “How well do you understand the important political issues facing our 
country?” (r = .47, p < .001) with 5-point response scales. To measure external political 
efficacy, participants were asked the extent to which they agree or disagree with the 
following statements on a 5-point scale: “People like me don’t have any say about what 
the government does,” and “Public officials don’t care much what people like me think” 
(r = .45, p < .001).  
 Civic duty. Following the recommendation of Blais and Galais (2016), a four-
item scale was used to measure civic duty (𝛼 = .73). The original study is designed to be 
given over the phone, with varying response options (0–3 and 0–10), depending on the 
question. In order to better fit the rest of the present survey, the question wording was 
adapted to fit an agree–disagree scale. For example, a sample item from the original 
scale, “How guilty would you feel if you did not vote in an election?” was reworded as “I 
would feel guilty if I did note vote in an election”.   
Table 2.  
Political variables 
 
Variable n M Mdn SD 𝛼 r 
Political participation (Outcome)  219 2.96 3.0 0.92 .84 - 
Political interest 218 3.43 3.0 1.12 - - 
Internal political efficacy 219 3.15 3.0 0.81 - .47** 
External political efficacy 219 2.85 3.0 0.97 - .45** 
Civic duty  219 3.61 3.8 0.97 .73 - 
**Correlation between scale items is significant at the .01 level 
 
Risk perception variables 
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 Policy issues. Risk perceptions were measured for each of the two policy issues—
climate change and social security. Variables from the extended parallel process model 
(perceived severity, susceptibility, and response efficacy) were measured with an 
adaptation of Witte, Cameron, McKeon, and Burkowitz’s (1996) Risk Behavior 
Diagnosis Scale. These variables were measured with three questions each on a 5-point 
agree–disagree scale. Sample questions included “Climate change is a significant threat” 
(severity, CC 𝛼 = .97, SS 𝛼 = .96), “It is likely that I will be affected by extreme weather 
events as a result of climate change” (susceptibility, CC 𝛼 = .79, SS 𝛼 = .76), and 
“Political participation is an effective way to address climate change” (response efficacy, 
CC 𝛼 = .83, SS 𝛼 = .81). In order to mitigate any priming effects, the order of these two 
policy blocks was randomized. See Table 3 for means and scale reliabilities. 
Political self-efficacy. The fourth variable in the extended parallel process model 
is self-efficacy. A measure of political self-efficacy was taken from Caprara, Vecchione, 
Capanna, and Mebane (2009). This 10-item, 5-point scale asks participants how capable 
they feel to perform a range of behaviors related to political participation (not at all 
capable–completely capable). Sample items include “State your own political opinion 
openly, even in clearly hostile settings” and “Use the means you have as a citizen to 
critically monitor the actions of your political representatives.” These items were 
combined (𝛼 = .92), with the mean representing self-efficacy in both the climate change 
and social security models. 
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Table 3.  
Risk perception variables 
 
Variable n M Mdn SD 𝛼 
Climate change severity 218 6.57 7.0 0.83 .97 
Climate change susceptibility 218 5.07 5.0 1.34 .79 
Climate change response efficacy  218 5.62 6.0 1.28 .83 
Social security severity 219 5.81 6.0 1.23 .96 
Social security susceptibility 219 5.17 5.0 1.22 .76 
Social security response efficacy  218 5.07 5.0 1.18 .81 
Political self-efficacy (5-point scale) 219 2.69 2.6 0.92 .92  
 
Affective polarization. A measure of polarization was taken from Druckman and 
Levendusky (2019), using two feeling thermometers. Participants were asked to rate their 
feelings toward the Republican and Democratic Parties on scales ranging from 0 
(cold/unfavorable) to 100 (warm/favorable). The score for the Democratic feeling 
thermometer was subtracted from the Republican feeling thermometer, resulting in a raw 
score for polarization. Regardless of sign, those who felt similarly about both parties had 
a lower score. An interval scale was then constructed from this initial score, creating five 
categories from 1 (-20 to 0 or 0 to 20) to 5 (-100 to -81 or 81 to 100), with higher scores 
indicating more polarization. 
Trait ratings. In order to gain a more nuanced understanding of participants’ 
perceptions of each party, a scale adapted from Druckman and Levendusky (2019) was 
included to assess the traits they associate with the Republican and Democratic party. 
Participants were asked how well a list of ten traits (five positive and five negative) 
describe each party. To avoid priming effects, the order in which the parties were 
presented was randomized. Druckman and Levendusky’s (2019) original instrument 
contained eight traits (five positive and three negative). In the present study, two 
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additional negative traits were added: dangerous and frightening. These additions were 
intended to better capture whether participants perceive the two parties as potential risks. 
Positive and negative trait ratings were created for each party by combining the five 
items. See Table 4 for means and scale reliabilities. 
Table 4.  
Affective polarization variables 
 
Variable n M Mdn SD 𝛼 
Polarization   200 2.90 3.0 1.30 - 
Positive traits Republican Party 215 2.16 2.0 0.80 .75 
Negative traits Republican Party  215 3.89 4.0 0.93 .86 
Positive traits Democratic Party 215 3.23 3.2 1.23 .77 
Negative traits Democratic Party  213 2.45 2.2 1.18 .88 
 
Results 
 A multiple linear regression was used to test H1. The model containing variables 
of interest in political communication explained a statistically significant portion of the 
variance in political participation, F(4, 213) = 30.83, p < .001, R2Adjusted = .36. Political 
interest (β = .51, t/213 = 8.11,  p < .001) and civic duty (β = .21, t/213 = 3.55, p = .001) 
explain a significant portion of the variance in political participation. Contrary to 
previous work, neither internal (β = .02, t/213 = 0.34, p = .736) nor external (β = .04, 
t/213 = 0.71, p = .478) political efficacy explain significant portions of the variance in 
participation. Therefore H1 was partially supported. 
 Two multiple linear regressions were used to test whether risk communication 
variables explain variance in political participation, based on perceptions of two different 
policy issues. The climate change model explained a statistically significant portion of 
the variance in political participation, F(4, 213) = 24.75, p < .001, R2Adjusted = .31. Perceived 
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severity of climate change (β = .18,  p < .01), political self-efficacy (β = .33, p < .001), 
and response efficacy (β = .18, p = .01) explained a significant portion of the variance in 
political participation. Perceived susceptibility to climate change effects was not a 
significant predictor of participation, therefore H2 was partially supported. See Table 5 
for a full reporting of the variables in each model. 
 The social security model explained a statistically significant portion of the 
variance in political participation, F(4, 213) = 17.01, p < .001, R2Adjusted = .23, carried only 
by political self-efficacy, β = .41, p < .001. Perceived severity of social security 
insolvency, perceived susceptibility to the effects of social security insolvency, and social 
security response efficacy were not significant predictors of political participation, 
therefore H3 was partially supported.  
A multiple regression was used to test whether perceptions of political parties 
explain variance in political participation. The model explained a statistically significant 
portion of the variance in participation, F(5, 190) = 11.39, p < .001, R2Adjusted = .21. While 
the model included polarization and positive and negative perceptions of both parties, 
only negative perceptions of the Republican Party was significant, β = .37, p < .001, 
therefore H4 was partially supported. 
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Table 5.  
Results of Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Political Participation 
   
β  p F df p R2A 
H1 Overall model 
  
30.83 4, 213 <.001 .36  
Political interest .51 <.001 
    
 
Internal political efficacy .02 .736 
    
 
External political efficacy .04 .478 
    
 
Civic duty  .21 <.001 
    
H2 Overall model 
  
24.75 4, 213 <.001 .31  
Climate change severity .18 .009 
    
 
Climate change susceptibility .08 .197 
    
 
Political self-efficacy .33 <.001 
    
 
Climate change response efficacy  .18 .011 
    
H3 Overall model 
  
17.01 4, 213 <.001 .23  
Social security severity .06 .407 
    
 
Social security susceptibility .10 .095 
    
 
Political self-efficacy .41 <.001 
    
 
Social security response efficacy  .10 .199 
    
H4 Overall model 
  
11.39 5, 190 <.001 .21  
Polarization .13 .116 
    
 
Positive perception Democratic Party .06 .492 
    
 
Negative perception Democratic Party .01 .897 
    
 
Positive perception Republican Party -.05 .506 
    
 
Negative perception Republican Party  .37 <.001 
    
Note: Significant variables are emphasized in bold. 
Two research questions were also posed, asking whether policy-centered risk 
perception variables could explain additional variance in participation when controlling 
for political variables. To investigate these questions, two hierarchical multiple 
regressions were conducted with political participation as the dependent variable. 
Political interest, civic duty, internal and external political efficacy entered 
simultaneously in the first block (Model 1), and risk perception variables for each policy 
issue were added in the second blocks. Model one predicted a significant portion of the 
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variance in participation in both the climate change and social security models, F(4,212) 
= 30.65, p < .001, R2A = .35. Adding risk and efficacy variables for climate change in the 
second model further contributed to the explanation of variance in participation, F(4, 
208) = 6.47, p < .001, R2A = .42. Climate change response efficacy (β = .17, p = .007) and 
political self-efficacy (β = .13, p = .046) contributed significantly to the model, while 
perceived severity and susceptibility for climate change did not.  
Adding risk and efficacy perceptions for social security to political variables of 
interest in the third model also contributed further to the explanation of variance in 
participation, F(4, 208) = 3.91, p = .004, R2A = .39. However, of the four variables, only 
political self-efficacy (β = .22, p = .001) was significant.  
Table 6.  
Summary of Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses, RQ1 and RQ2 
  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
β  p β  p β  p 
Political interest .51 < .001 .36 < .001 .41 < .001 
Civic duty .21 .001 .15 .007 .18 .002 
Internal political efficacy .02 .737 .01 .821 -.01 .923 
External political efficacy .04 .479 .01 .895 .33 .574 















.13 .046 .22 .001 
Social Security severity 
    
-.03 .662 
Social Security susceptibility 
    
.05 .332 
Social Security response  
efficacy 
    
.06 .401 
Model Summary 
F(4,212) = 30.65  
p < .001  
R2A = .35 
F(4,208) = 6.47 
p < .001  
R2A = .42 
F(4,208) = 3.91  
p = .004 
R2A = .39 
Note: Significant variables are emphasized in bold. 
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A third research question asked whether perceptions of political parties added to 
the explanatory power of the political variables. To investigate this question, a 
hierarchical multiple regression was conducted with political interest, civic duty, internal 
and external political efficacy in the first block (Model 1; F/4,191 = 27.61, p < .001, R2A = 
.35) and polarization, positive perceptions of each party and negative perceptions of each 
party in the second block. The resulting fourth model contributed further to the 
explanation of variance in participation, F(5,186) = 4.03, p = .002, R2A = .40. Of the 
affective variables, only negative perceptions of the Republican Party (β = .26, p < .001) 
was significant.  
Table 7.  
Summary of Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses, RQ3 
  
Model 1 Model 4 
 
β  p β  p 
Political interest .51 < .001 .44 < .001 
Civic duty .21 .001 .16 .009 
Internal political efficacy .02 .750 .04 .536 




Positive perceptions of the Democratic Party 
  
-.12 .168 
Negative perceptions of the Democratic Party 
  
-.12 .175 
Positive perceptions of the Republican Party 
  
.08 .299 
Negative perceptions of the Republican Party 
  
.26 < .001 
Model Summary 
F(4,191) = 27.61  
p < .001  
R2A = .35 
F(5,186) = 4.03 
p = .002  
R2A = .40 





The results of this study demonstrate that risk perceptions could help expand our 
understanding of political participation. The participants in the present study reflect a 
young, liberal demographic that aligns in many ways with Bennett’s (2008) idea of the 
actualizing citizen. Understanding the perceptions and behavior of this group offers 
valuable insight into the changing trends in political participation. A key limitation of this 
study, however, is the use of a convenience sample. While participants in the present 
study largely reflect a demographic that is becoming more active in politics (Cilluffo & 
Fry, 2019; Fabina, 2021), probability sampling from a larger population is needed to 
draw more firm conclusions. What this study can offer is a glimpse into possible fruitful 
avenues of inquiry. 
Political Variables 
Of the four political variables tested, political interest contributes most to the 
explanation of the variance in participation, followed by civic duty. This aligns with 
previous research that suggests that interest is a necessary precursor to participation 
(Blais, 2000; Blais & Daoust, 2020; Brady, Verba, & Schlozman, 1995; Prior, 2010). 
Civic duty has long been associated with electoral participation (Blais, 2000; Riker and 
Oldeshook, 1968) but recent trends have caused some scholars to question how well it 
accounts for the political behavior of younger citizens (Bennett, 2008; Bennett, Wells, & 
Rank, 2009). The present study affirms its continued importance for this group.  
Contrary to previous findings, neither internal nor external political efficacy were 
significantly associated with political participation in this study. This lack of impact may 
be due to the anemic scales. Consistent with other recent research in the United States, 
 29 
the present study used the measurement of political efficacy from the American National 
Election Studies (ANES). Because these measures include only two questions each to 
measure internal and external efficacy, internal reliability cannot be established. Though 
the correlations between items were significant and moderate, future research should 
return to the issues surrounding measurement of political efficacy. Given the persistent 
significance of political self-efficacy in the models, the role of efficacy in political 
participation should not be overlooked.  
Policy Risk Perceptions 
Political self-efficacy was included as one of four variables in the risk perception 
models and explained a significant portion of the variance in participation in all of the 
models to which it was added. The other variables in these two models were issue-
specific measurements of participants’ perceptions of climate change and social security. 
The Extended Parallel Process Model predicts adoption of the recommended behavior 
when both threat and efficacy perceptions are high. Though the present study is cross-
sectional and cannot establish a causal link, these results suggest that the EPPM could be 
applied to political behavior. 
There was a notable difference between the two policy issue models. In the 
climate change model, perceived severity, perceived response efficacy, and political self-
efficacy were significantly associated with participation; in the social security model the 
only significant variable was political self-efficacy, which was not issue-specific. It 
appears that risk perceptions of social security did not impact political participation in the 
present study. This is likely due to the life stage of the participants. While protecting 
social security for use by future generations of Americans generally garners widespread 
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support (Dunlap & McCright, 2011), it may not be a relevant concern for college 
students. It is also possible that issue-based participation is only significant for polarized 
issues. While climate change elicits strong reactions from partisans on both sides of the 
political spectrum, social security is a less controversial issue (Dunlap & McCright, 2011; 
Hart & Feldman, 2016; Jamieson, 2011; Pew Research Center, 2019). This may impact 
the degree to which it influences participation among political partisans. Future research 
should investigate whether salient issues for different populations contribute differently 
to their political behaviors.  
When the issue-specific risk perception variables were added to the political 
variables, climate change response efficacy was retained in the final model but not 
perceived severity nor perceived susceptibility. This suggests that efficacy perceptions 
may drive participation more than the perceived importance or personal relevance of even 
salient policy issues.  
Party Risk Perceptions  
Record voter turnout in the 2018 midterm and 2020 presidential elections 
reversed a decades-long downward trend in electoral participation (Campbell, 2006; 
Norris, 2015; Persily & Stewart III, 2021). Public discourse during the campaigns 
suggested that a driving force in electoral participation might be perceptions of a political 
party as a risk. That is, an individual may be more motivated to vote in order to prevent 
an unfavorable party from winning than to advance a favorable party. Rhetoric from both 
Republicans and Democrats leading up to the 2020 presidential election framed their 
political opponents as dangerous and frightening, and as a risk to the wellbeing of the 
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country (e.g. Badger, 2020; Ball, 2016; Cilliza, 2020; Costa, Weigel, Sonmez, & Wagner, 
2020). It is possible that these messages are related to the record-breaking turnout.  
Of the affective polarization variables examined in the present study, negative 
perceptions of the Republican Party explained the most variance in political participation. 
By itself and coupled with political interest and civic duty, affective polarization—or the 
magnitude of the difference between one’s feelings toward the Democratic and 
Republican Parties—did explain a significant portion of the variance in participation but 
the effect disappeared when other affective variables were added. In the present sample, 
it seems that a driving affective force behind participation is negative perceptions of the 
Republican Party. Because the participants in this study overwhelmingly leaned toward a 
liberal political ideology and self-identified as aligning with the Democratic Party, these 
results are perhaps not surprising. Future research should investigate whether the same 
trends hold among more conservative populations. A key limitation of this study is that 
the full complement of EPPM variables was not measured for affective polarization. 
While negative perceptions of the parties could represent perceived threat, future research 
should measure feelings of susceptibility to the “threat” of the outparty and should 
include efficacy perceptions.      
Implications  
Taken together, these findings add to the literature in three ways. First, they 
affirm the conclusions of previous research in political communication (Blais, 2000; 
Blais & Daoust, 2020; Brady, Verba, & Schlozman, 1995; Prior, 2010). Political interest 
and civic duty continue to be robustly associated with political participation. While some 
have expressed concerns that younger citizens in particular may not be as motivated by 
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civic duty, the present study suggests that it remains a relevant factor for participation. 
Future research should continue to examine determinants of participation for younger 
generations, and to support efforts to foster interest and civic duty in future generations of 
citizens. 
Second, the present study highlights the importance of self-efficacy for political 
participation and calls for a renewed investigation into the conceptualization and 
operationalization of the construct in political communication. While efficacy has long 
been theorized to play a role in political participation (Campbell, Gurin, & Miller, 1954; 
Craig, 1979; Niemi, Craig, & Mattei, 1991), the performance of internal and 
(particularly) external political efficacy has been unstable in prior research (Acock & 
Clarke, 1990; Caprara et al., 2009; Chamberlain, 2012). This may be due to inconsistent 
measurement (Caprara et al., 2009; Chamberlain, 2012; Craig, Niemi, & Silver, 1990; 
Morrell, 2003; Niemi, Craig, & Mattei, 1991), which limits the ability to meaningfully 
compare results across studies.  
This instability may also suggest that the evolution of the concept of efficacy 
within the field has not kept pace with the development in other subfields such as risk 
communication. Caprara et al. (2009) argue for a return to Bandura’s Social Cognitive 
Theory to revitalize the concept. They use SCT to create a more robust measure of 
political efficacy which asks whether participants feel capable of performing different 
political behaviors. This aligns conceptually with internal efficacy, though some items on 
the scale do incorporate elements of external efficacy. In the present study, their measure 
of political self-efficacy was a significant predictor of participation in the linear models 
and was retained in the stepwise models, while internal and external efficacy were not. 
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The next best efficacy measure to predict political participation in the present study was 
climate change response efficacy. Items on this response efficacy scale asked whether 
participants believed that government action could make a difference for climate change. 
This aligns more clearly with external political efficacy. It is possible that the original 
ideas behind internal and external efficacy are still relevant, but the current measurement 
instrument used in political communication has been diluted beyond usefulness. Future 
research should take up this persistent issue, and may benefit from combining insights 
from risk communication theory to fine tune the application of efficacy for politics. 
Third, this study extends recent work on affective polarization that suggests that 
participation could be motivated by fear of the outparty. While this indicates that 
affective polarization has the potential to mobilize partisans (Stapleton, 2020), the cost 
likely outweighs any benefit. Affective polarization is a growing concern among political 
scholars, with projected deleterious consequences including decreased support for 
bipartisanship (Levendusky, 2013), increased proliferation and acceptance of 
misinformation (Garrett, Long, & Jeong, 2019), and non-political conflict among citizens 
(Iyengar et al., 2019). In the present study negative perceptions of the Republican Party 
emerged as the strongest affective predictor of participation, neutralizing the effect of 
affective polarization. In other words, the degree of difference between in-party and out-
party evaluations was less important than the strength of negative out-party perceptions. 
While this lopsided result was likely due to the large portion of the sample that aligned 
with liberal politics and the Democratic Party, future work should examine whether these 
results are true for other populations, and should explore the relationship between 
negative evaluations of the outparty and other important variables.  
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Conclusion  
 This study draws on concepts from political and risk communication to inform 
our understanding of what motivates people to be politically active. Inspired by concerns 
that traditional models of participation do not perform as well among younger and more 
diverse populations (e.g. Bennett, 2008), alternate variables are considered including risk 
perceptions surrounding policy issues and political parties. Results show that established 
political variables such as political interest and civic duty remain strongly associated with 
participation, while offering support for several new variables of interest from the risk 
communication literature. The present study explored risk and efficacy perceptions for 
two policy issues, as well as political parties as a potential risk. Results show that threat 
and efficacy perceptions for climate change and negative perceptions of the Republican 
Party explained additional variance in political participation when added to known 
predictors of participation. As scholars and practitioners look for factors that help explain 
recent reversals in participation trends, risk communication offers perspectives worth 
exploring. Bennett (2008) observes that our increasingly network-based society may 
herald a shift to participatory behavior that aligns with or reflects individual identity and 
self-interest. By exploring the contribution of individuals’ threat and efficacy perceptions 
to explanations of variance in political participation, this study brings attention to the 
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Appendix: Demographic Regression 
Table 8.  
Results of Multiple Regression Analysis With Demographic Variables as the Determinants  
  
β  t p F df p R2A 
Overall model 
   
.384 5, 169 .859 -0.18 
Age -.96 -1.03 .303 
    
Education Level .10 1.13 .258 
    
Ethnicity .03 0.34 .736 
    
Income -.03 -0.38 .702 
    
Sex -.02 -0.31 .755 
    
 
 
